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Abstract The third UN World Congress on Disaster Risk
Reduction, held in Sendai, Japan in March 2015, agreed on
a new framework to guide disaster risk reduction policy
and practice for the next 15 years. The Sendai Framework
for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (SFDRR) leaves
important implementation issues unspecified and poten-
tially creates both problems and opportunities for complex,
multilevel governance systems in coping with hazards and
disastrous events. Early warning systems (EWS), if built
into the mainstream of planning for development and dis-
aster relief and recovery, could present a significant
opportunity to realize many SFDRR goals. We explore the
complexities of using hydrometeorological EWS to prepare
for drought and flood disasters in the densely populated
communities of Pakistan’s Indus River Basin in contrast to
the African Sahel’s less densely settled grasslands. Mul-
tilevel governance systems are often dominated by a top-
down, technocentric, centralized management bias and
have great difficulty responding to the needs of peripheral
and vulnerable populations. People-centered, bottom-up
approaches that incorporate disaggregated communities
with local knowledge into a balanced, multilevel disaster
risk management and governance structure have a
dramatically better chance of realizing the SFDRR goals
for disaster risk reduction.
Keywords Early warning systems  Infrastructure
development  Land-use planning  Policy
implementation  Risk governance  Sendai
Framework  Science-policy interface
1 Introduction
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
2015–2030 (SFDRR) (UNISDR 2015), recently negotiated
in the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction (UNISDR) conference in Sendai, Japan, repla-
ces the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 (HFA)
(UNISDR 2005) as a guiding policy document to steer
disaster risk governance. Although the Hyogo Framework
for Action was able to bring disaster risk reduction (DRR)
to the attention of international and national development
agencies for investment priorities, the effectiveness of HFA
in ‘‘bending’’ the disaster damage curve remains to be seen.
During 2005–2015 ‘‘over 700000 people lost their lives,
over 1.4 million were injured and approximately 23 million
were made homeless as a result of disasters. Overall, more
than 1.5 billion people were affected by disasters in various
ways. Women, children and people in vulnerable situations
were disproportionately affected. The total economic loss
was more than $1.3 trillion. In addition, between 2008 and
2012, 144 million people were displaced by disasters’’
(UNISDR 2015, p. 4). Many regional and global scale
studies suggest increases in exposure to hydrometeoro-
logical hazards, in particular from climate change-induced
alterations in the frequency, intensity, and extent of
extreme events (IPCC 2012). Coupled with other social and
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economic drivers of vulnerability, these changes could
amplify risk and damages. The SFDRR sets out four pri-
ority actions to counter this trend: (1) understanding dis-
aster risk; (2) strengthening disaster risk governance to
manage disaster risk; (3) investing in disaster risk reduction
for resilience; and (4) enhancing disaster preparedness for
effective response, as well as to ‘‘Build Back Better’’ in
recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.
The SFDRR acknowledges that ‘‘overall, the Hyogo
Framework for Action has provided critical guidance in
efforts to reduce disaster risk and contributed to the pro-
gress towards the achievement of the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals. Its implementation has, however,
highlighted a number of gaps in addressing the underlying
disaster risk factors, in the formulation of goals and pri-
orities for action, in the need to foster disaster resilience at
all levels and in ensuring adequate means of implemen-
tation’’ (UNISDR 2015, p. 5, author bold). In the light of
the third identified gap in SFDRR, this article addresses the
question: Does SFDRR provide better ‘‘means of imple-
mentation’’ for multilevel governance systems than HFA?
Without appropriate ‘‘means of implementation,’’ that is a
risk governance system, a framework would not be
expected to lead to changes in disaster risk reduction out-
comes. Both multilevel risk governance and resource/in-
vestment allocations are critical components for delivering
the ‘‘means of implementation’’ of a policy/framework.
Despite the many DRR strategies that could be assessed
for SFDRR implementation, this study focuses on an
emerging opportunity that pertains to the mainstreaming of
hydrometeorological early warning systems (EWS) as a
DRR strategy in development and land-use planning pro-
cesses across multiple levels of governments. The SFDRR
endorses the use of multihazard EWS as a sound disaster
risk reduction investment strategy and promotes the
incorporation of disaster risk reduction in development and
planning processes across developed and developing
countries. One of the major goals declared in SFDRR is to
‘‘substantially increase the availability of and access to
multi-hazard EWS and disaster risk information and
assessments to the people by 2030’’ (UNISDR 2015, p. 8).
Further, SFDRR declares under Priority 3 (investing in
disaster risk reduction for resilience) that both national and
local level government agencies must ‘‘(f) promote the
mainstreaming of disaster risk assessments into land-use
policy development and implementation, including urban
planning, land degradation assessments and informal and
non-permanent housing, and the use of guidelines and
follow-up tools informed by anticipated demographic and
environmental changes’’ and ‘‘(g) promote the main-
streaming of disaster risk assessment, mapping and man-
agement into rural development planning and management
of, inter alia, mountains, rivers, coastal flood plain areas,
drylands, wetlands and all other areas prone to droughts
and flooding, including through the identification of areas
that are safe for human settlement and at the same time
preserving ecosystem functions that help reduce risks’’
(UNISDR 2015, p. 15).
Effectively designed hydrometeorological EWS, which
are integrated with institutional mechanisms at multiple
levels of governance, have the potential to both mitigate
the impacts of and increase resilience to hydrometeoro-
logical induced flood and drought risks. Mainstreaming
climate impact forecast information into land-use planning
and infrastructure development processes can enhance
sustainable development and mitigate the medium- to long-
term risk from climate change as a proactive adaptation
intervention (Zia 2012). In the broader context of adapta-
tion to climate change, effective integration of EWS with
institutional and policy-design processes have the potential
to increase the resilience and decrease the vulnerability
from hydrometeorological related risks. This potential,
however, needs to be tested/implemented in the field with
real-time integration of EWS with policy and planning
processes.
EWS could be deployed for a variety of natural hazards
including sudden-onset events such as earthquakes, tsuna-
mis (Taubenbo¨ck et al. 2009; Liu et al. 2009; Thomalla and
Larsen 2010; Spahn et al. 2010), landslides (Intrieri et al.
2012), and flooding from rivers and tsunamis (Basher
2006; Thieler et al. 2009) as well as more gradual pro-
cesses like drought (Pozzi et al. 2013; Pulwarty and
Sivakumar 2014) and malaria transmission that result from
climate variability (Thomson et al. 2006). As such, the
hazards for which EWS are established to mitigate can act
on a multitude of temporal and spatial scales. The temporal
scales (early warning lead times) range from minutes in the
case of earthquake and tsunami, to hours in the event of
river flooding, and at times months and even years in the
case of drought. For more gradual processes, for instance
drought and desertification, a different kind of sustainable
hydrometeorological EWS is required to monitor slow
onset, incremental but accumulative changes, for example,
creeping environmental change (Glantz 1999). Climate
change-driven forecasts under alternate scenarios, or rep-
resentative concentration pathways (RCPs), can generate
medium to long-term forecasts.
Though replete with ‘‘dos’’ and ‘‘don’ts,’’ the SFDRR
lacks any specific guidance on the means of implementa-
tion of proposed DRR strategies, in particular the integra-
tion of EWS with development and planning processes
across multiple scales of governance from local to regional,
national, and international administrative units. Both Pri-
ority 2 and 3 contain general framework guidelines that
could be used to infer different risk governance and
mainstreaming scenarios in specific country-wide or
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continent-wide contexts. Under Priority 2 (strengthening
disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk), the
SFDRR vision of a multilevel risk governance is replete
with contradictions. Implementation is caught between
donor and national government controlled top-down gov-
ernance mechanisms as opposed to people- and commu-
nity-centered risk governance. Similarly, under Priority 3
(investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience), vague
policy and programming guidelines are provided for the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and other bilateral and multilateral donor coun-
tries with which they are expected to generate investment
resources for DRR strategies, such as the mainstreaming of
DRR in development processes or better integration of
EWS in end-user decision making processes; however,
there are no specific mandatory requirements for allocation
of DRR investments in OECD or other financial mecha-
nisms. Within countries, in particular in developing coun-
tries, lack of investment funding and adaptive capacity
poses perilous challenges to prepare and plan for imple-
mentation of a climate-resilient development and land-use
planning agenda. Lack of specific guidance on multilevel
risk governance mechanisms as well as mandatory invest-
ment/funding allocations makes it hard to believe that over
the next 15 years SFDRR will be able to overcome the
‘‘means of implementation’’ challenges that have emerged
as an important gap as a result of HFA implementation in
2005–2015.
The implementation of the UNISDR recommended
approach to EWS under HFA identified a range of policy
and governance challenges. The UNISDR proposes
development of four elements of weather-based EWS that
encompass risk knowledge, monitoring and warning ser-
vices of risk, dissemination and communication of the risk
information, and the capability of response (Basher 2006).
A fundamental aspect within the UNISDR elements is the
incorporation of local knowledge and integration of the
EWS into the daily life, awareness, and ontologies of the
local population. In this vein, the UNISDR framework
could be employed to mitigate and minimize the impact of
extreme flood events in large hydrological watersheds like
the lower Mekong River as well as smaller basins (Plate
2007; Ardalan et al. 2009; Alfieri et al. 2012; Fakhruddin
2014). Utilizing UNISDR EWS as a baseline framework in
the case of floods and droughts could potentially reduce the
impact and effects of such gradual processes, but the
integration of hydrometeorological EWS with end-user
decision making and planning processes still poses funda-
mental challenges (Kelman and Glantz 2014).
In Sect. 2 of this article, the SDFRR ‘‘means of imple-
mentation’’ challenges are illustrated in the context of
mainstreaming hydrometeorological EWS in the develop-
ment and land-use planning processes in the Indus Basin
and the Sahel region of Africa. In both regions, human
activities and anthropogenic climate change pose enormous
water and food-security related challenges, as well as
benefits and opportunities for action. Further, this section
focuses on the potential of EWS in mainstreaming DRR in
development and planning processes that has not been
realized, at least in the Indus Basin and Sahel regions as it
was expected in the landmark Hyogo Framework for
Action. In Sect. 3 we assess the tension/ambiguity between
‘‘technocentric’’ and ‘‘top-down’’ versus ‘‘people-cen-
tered’’ and ‘‘bottom-up’’ risk governance approaches for
implementation of the DRR strategies negotiated in Sendai.
In the context of the case study areas, we investigate why
practical implementation of EWS since HFA has remained
skewed towards technical/top-down investments in
improving the monitoring and forecasting capabilities of
EWS, and less emphasis has been placed on incorporating
the risk perceptions and decision making of the EWS end-
users in designing and communicating early warnings.
Although the Sendai Framework, compared with HFA,
emphasizes a ‘‘people-centered,’’ ‘‘bottom-up’’ shift in
broad risk governance, the underlying funding and insti-
tutional mechanisms (Priority 3 in SFDRR) appear to
assume a technocentric, top-down implementation of DRR
strategies. This focus is particularly true in the generation
and allocation of financial and technical resources for
investments in developing EWS and mainstreaming DRR
in development. Finally, in Sect. 4 we develop an argument
that UNISDR and relevant implementation parties need to
strike a balance between top-down/technocentric and bot-
tom-up/people-centered implementation approaches for
SFDRR in a multilevel risk governance context.
2 SFDRR and DRR: Case Studies
of Implementation Challenges
Climate change presents special challenges for disaster risk
reduction. The best places to examine those problems are
found in difficult environments where livelihoods are par-
ticularly vulnerable. We choose two dryland environments,
the Indus River Basin of Pakistan and the transitional semi-
arid grasslands of the African Sahel, as the focus of our
exploration of how complex and difficult realizing the
goals of the SFDRR may be.
2.1 Indus Basin
The Indus Basin’s millions of inhabitants are vulnerable to
the formidable combination of societal vulnerabilities and
climate change. It is expected that climate change will
significantly affect the behavior and severity of naturally
occurring hazards, such as floods, droughts, heat waves,
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and cyclones, sometimes increasing their frequency and
intensity and sometimes decreasing them (IPCC 2012,
2014). In addition to the added uncertainty in the occur-
rence of natural meteorological hazards, the Indus Basin
has a major concern in the expected melting of Himalayan
glaciers. The increase in glacial melt will severely disturb
the hydrometeorological cycle of the Indus River system,
an essential source of food and water for millions of people
(Immerzeel et al. 2010; Zia 2013). Superimposed on the
natural hazards is the plethora of increasing societal vul-
nerabilities: rising populations of mostly homeless poor
people, rural to urban migration (Mustafa and Sawas 2013),
the growth of urban and suburban slums (Marx et al. 2013),
financial volatility, economic insecurity, energy shortages
(Komal and Faisal 2015), lack of human rights and law
enforcement, political instability within country borders as
well as across international borders, and ongoing ethnic,
civic, linguistic, and religious proxy wars (Zia and Hameed
2014).
In this context of societal vulnerability, it is not sur-
prising that breakdowns of disaster management strike
almost every year in one of the Indus Basin countries, in
particular Pakistan and Afghanistan. Figure 1 shows the
international boundaries of the Indus Basin. The 2010
floods in upper and later on in lower Indus affected more
than 18 million people, caused 1985 deaths, and damaged
or destroyed 1.7 million houses; and hypothetically
increased the influence of extremist organizations in the
flood affected areas, though the State and civil society were
able to retain political control in the short run (Hasan and
Zaidi 2012). It is important to note that extremism in
Pakistan, which was initially clustered around tribal areas
in the upper Indus Basin, has recently increased in south-
ern, lower Indus, areas (Javid 2011). Hasan and Zaidi
(2012, p. 336) astutely note the impact of the 2010 floods
on extremism in the short and long run: ‘‘Much of the
damage caused by the recent flood has damaged the regions
under manipulation and influence of the religious funda-
mentalists, and Pakistan’s government has been sustaining
pressures of the Western world to continue onslaught on
this region, as these areas have been said to provide safe
heaven for Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Although
with the support of the people, civil society and army, it
could be argued that the situation has not adequately
allowed insurgents to take a major political lead however it
could still lead to future political unrest. The flooding
effect could still trigger massive resentment against present
regime; political resiliency also has to lock horns with
multiple challenges in the shape of ongoing insurgencies,
ever disturbing urban sectarian dissension, frightening
suicide bombings in opposition to central institutions,
economic weakening and regional political issues.’’
Drought, another hydrometeorological hazard, also
regularly afflicts the region. Unless systematic approaches
to vulnerability reduction, early warning communication
systems, and institutional mechanisms to cope with disas-
ters through changes in land-use planning and economic
development are pursued in advance, the adverse outcomes
from natural hazards will increase in their severity and
frequency according to human-induced climate change
scenarios developed by IPCC (2014).
Climate change is expected to shift the spatial and tem-
poral distributions of precipitation from the summer mon-
soon over the Indus River Basin. Increased greenhouse gas
concentrations are expected to increase both the land–water
temperature contrast and absolute temperature of the oceans,
strengthening the monsoon (Turner and Annamalai 2012).
Yet this expected trend has not been observed. Turner and
Annamalai (2012) found that since 1950 the amount of
rainfall produced by the South Asian summer monsoon has
been decreasing and shifting eastward. An important caveat
is that aerosols have been increasing over the region, and
could be responsible for mitigating expected increasing
trends (Ramanathan et al. 2005). While average observed
seasonal precipitation resulting from the South Asian sum-
mer monsoon has decreased over the past six decades, an
analysis by Singh et al. (2014) found historical shifts in
extreme wet and dry spells. Specifically, peak-season pre-
cipitation has decreased while daily precipitation variability
has increased, and the frequency of dry spells has increased
while the intensity of dry spells has decreased (Singh et al.
2014). Projections of the South Asian summer monsoon by
global climate models (GCMs) are mixed and dominated in
the near-term by decadal variability. Ueda et al. (2006)
found increasing seasonal precipitation despite a weakening
of the monsoonal circulation, and Turner and Annamalai
(2012) found a range of responses from unchanged to
increased seasonal precipitation.
Uncertainties about monsoon variability and glacial melt
timing pose enormous planning and policy challenges for
the Indus Basin. The Indus Basin is a breadbasket for
millions of people across the subcontinent, yet glacial melt
and monsoon variability threatens the future of food pro-
duction in its catchment regions. Effective water and food
management policies require proactive land-use planning
that is shaped by high resolution climate and hydromete-
orological forecasts at all possible lead times, ranging from
daily and weekly to annual and decadal. Integration of
these forecasts into agency and individual decision-making
processes is another critical need for effectively building
adaptive capacity and resiliency in the basin. Both the
generation and integration of climatological and hydrom-
eteorological forecasts with decision making and planning
processes require significant changes in current governance
practices and resource allocations that affect the evolution
of land-use development pathways.
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In earlier work in the Indus Basin, Zia and Glantz
(2012), based upon multiple stakeholder workshops with
local policy-making and planning agencies, scientists, and
civil society organizations, identified a range of policy and
governance challenges for designing resilient risk man-
agement and land-use planning approaches. Policies such
as the introduction of flood insurance programs or gover-
nance of multihazard ‘‘risk zones’’ do not lend themselves
to ‘‘linear’’ policy solutions as the SFDRR appears to
assume. Mere injection of donor grants and soft loans in
building technologically advanced EWS do not necessarily
result in the introduction of climate resilient policy and
planning processes. Rather, the climatological and
hydrometeorological information is added to a mix of
power struggles in rapidly globalizing societies such as
Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan. Land grabs and related
power struggles, on top of weak executive and judicial
institutions, can leave such EWS forecasts as mere pieces
of paper, waiting meaningful incorporation into agency or
individual decision making. The ‘‘means of implementa-
tion’’ gap identified as a result of the HFA experiment will
have similar political and governance challenges when the
time comes to implement SFDRR. The potential of cli-
matological and hydrometeorological EWS as a strategy
for positioning DRR in development and planning pro-
cesses has not yet been realized in the Indus Basin. But a
fresh and novel way to conceptualize the SFDRR ‘‘means
of implementation’’ could provide a transformational shift
in business as usual top-down governance and resource
allocation scenarios. Explicit focus on multilevel risk
governance regimes with transparent and accountable
participation and empowerment of local scale communi-
ties, in particular vulnerable communities, will need to be
prioritized in SFDRR-driven investments, programs, and
projects.
2.2 Sahel Region
Much like in the Indus Basin, in the Sahel region of Africa
(Fig. 2) climate change is likely to work in tandem with
societal vulnerabilities to produce both direct and indirect
negative effects on the food security1 (IPCC 2012). In the
relatively drier areas of the Sahel, food crop production is
marginal or not viable due to a modest size, annually
variable soil moisture store with which to sustain plant
growth, high rainfall variability (skewed to dryness), and
frequent occurrence of severe prolonged multiyear
droughts (Glantz 1992; Rosenzweig et al. 2001; Challinor
et al. 2007). Under a changing climate, severe regional
droughts have become more frequent. Funk et al. (2008)
concluded that the tendency for main growing season
Fig. 1 Indus River Basin Source ICIMOD. Reprint with permission of ICIMOD
1 According to Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), food
security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and
economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.
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rainfall to decline has already contributed to food insecu-
rity in eastern and southern Africa. Additionally, the
expanded ranges of crop pests and altered transmission
dynamics of insect pests and plant diseases predicted by
climate change will likely exacerbate food availability
problems in the Sahel countries (Rosenzweig et al. 2001).
Not only can climate change be a significant factor that
could undermine food security in Africa, but also ecosys-
tem degradation, population growth, poor governance
systems, low adaptive capacity, and economic decline has
and will also likely contribute to continuing food insecurity
in the Sahel region (Challinor et al. 2007; Funk et al. 2008;
Bohle et al. 1994; Brown et al. 2007). The high sensitivity
of food crop systems in Africa to climate is also exacer-
bated by constraints such as a heavy disease burden, con-
flicts and political instability, debt burden, and an unfair
international trade system (Challinor et al. 2007). There-
fore integration of climatological and hydrometeorological
EWS in land-use and food planning processes could
potentially yield considerable benefits in the Sahel region
of Africa.
Relatively modest adverse changes in economies imply
critical shifts in food security for those social groups that
are currently vulnerable (Bohle et al. 1994). For example,
the association between El Nin˜o events and famines that
killed tens of millions across the tropics in the late nine-
teenth century has been well documented. Davis (2002)
argues that in the case of El Nin˜o famine was triggered by
drought, but was caused by the way political and economic
colonization deprived people of their entitlements to nat-
ural resources. In contrast, droughts and famine can also
bring many communities together in times of hardship and
reduce conflict. The pathways in the exchange and political
economies that ameliorate or mitigate the effects of climate
change will probably have the more dominant effect on
vulnerable individuals, groups, and classes in the Sahel
region as well (Bohle et al. 1994). In addition, according to
Challinor et al. (2007), whether the increasing demand for
Fig. 2 Sahel eco-region
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food due to population rise will be met primarily by
extensification or intensification depends on land suitability
and on the yield attainable from that land, as well as on the
growth of national economies and of income-driven
effective demand for food in the Sahel. Yields in Africa
remain amongst the lowest in the world: in sub-Saharan
regions, for example, mean rainfed cereal yields are
0.8 tons/ha, which is 0.4 tons/ha below the lowest figure
for any other region. During the past 50 years, some 60 %
of the growth in cereal output in Africa has been from area
expansion and 40 % from yield increase (Challinor et al.
2007). Given the threefold expected increase in population
by the end of this century, African Sahel countries cannot
afford to be complacent about addressing the growing
challenge of food security and sustainability as land use
expansion and intensification accelerate against the back-
ground of increasing vulnerability to climate change.
In this context, the institutionalization of medium to
long-term drought early warning forecast systems and their
mainstreaming with land-use planning processes can pro-
vide a very useful science-policy interface in the Sahel
countries. In particular, comparison of intensive agriculture
versus agroecological land-use development pathways to
produce a sustainable and equitable system would avoid
worst-case food insecurity challenges brought about by
climate change. Currently, there are a number of interna-
tional, regional, and national EWS operating in the Sahel
region. But in general these systems lack multilevel inte-
gration and national support and networks for local-level
dissemination of information (Bailey 2013). At the inter-
national level, the Food and Agriculture Organization’s
Global Information and Early Warning System on Food
and Agriculture (GIEWS), the World Food Program’s
Humanitarian Early Warning Service (HEWS), and the
USAID Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS
Net) collectively monitor the whole of the Sahel region and
produce monthly reports, bulletins, and drought status
updates (Pulwarty and Sivakumar 2014). International
level monitoring systems target national level decision-
makers and international support with the expectation that
once the warning is issued aid will cascade down to the
local community level. But in an analysis of the FEWS Net
coverage of the 2007 floods in the Sahel region, Samimi
et al. (2012) question the reliability of the information
produced for emergency conditions at the regional and
local scale because of the reliance on quick, standardized
estimates.
At the regional level, the Inter-State Committee for
Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) collects regional
level monitoring data from the Agrometeorology, Hydrol-
ogy, Meteorology (AGRHYMET) center in Niger, and
creates a forum to connect national level decision-makers
(Traore et al. 2014). The CILSS EWS was established in
the 1970s and has made great advances in regional moni-
toring and capacity building, but the AGRHYMET moni-
toring system still faces issues of data acquisition from
countries, limited observation points, and less than rapid
transfer of data to monitoring organizations (Traore et al.
2014). Finally, individual states in the Sahel region have
varying operational levels of monitoring and EWS. Niger
and Ethiopia both have relatively long standing EWS,
housed in government agencies that regularly collect local
level monitoring data to pass up the administrative hier-
archy to national level decision-makers, whereas Maurita-
nia, Gambia, and Chad have either no national EWS or
very limited EWS capacity (Bailey 2013). National and
regional level EWS rely on local observations and moni-
toring stations, but there is a lack of structured and inte-
grated systems of communication that disseminate
information out to local communities beyond the trickle
down of policy and international aid.
One recent attempt to fill this integration gap is a part-
nership between the Rainwatch initiative by the University
of Oklahoma and the African Climate Exchange (AfClix),
a UK-based boundary organization. Boundary organiza-
tions, such as AfClix, sit at the science-policy interface and
by design, involve and are accountable to actors from both
side of the interface (Guston 2001). The Rainwatch ini-
tiative is producing near real-time monitoring from a series
of stations in Niger, which is made available to government
officials, but the partnership with AfClix has opened up
channels for two-way dialogue on the ground through
partnerships with humanitarian and development decision-
makers in the region (Boyd et al. 2013). The Rainwatch/
AfClix partnership offers a glimpse into what a more col-
laborative science-policy interface could look like, inte-
grating bottom-up, people-centered initiatives with top-
down decision-making.
3 Tension Between ‘‘Technocentric’’ and ‘‘Top-
Down’’ Versus ‘‘People-Centered’’ and
‘‘Bottom-Up’’ Risk Governance Approaches
Developing countries, especially South Asian and African
Sahel societies, are extremely vulnerable to climatic shifts
(Glantz and Adeel 2000; Glantz 2003; van Aalst 2006; Zia
and Glantz 2012; Zia 2013; IPCC 2014). Vulnerabilities
accrue from causes such as rising poverty, non-flexible
sources of livelihood, poor disaster management, and the
lack of long-term risk governance. Amidst this complex
social, economic, and political context, the implementation
of SFDRR can neither be done through a linear science-
policy interface, nor through a top-down, technocratic,
controlled allocation of investments and resources. A clo-
ser analysis of SFDRR, however, reveals that it is beset
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with this top-down/technocratic and bottom-up/people-
centered tension.
SFDRR for example tries to present both perspectives:
‘‘… in order to reduce disaster risk, there is a need to
address existing challenges and prepare for future ones by
focusing on: monitoring, assessing and understanding dis-
aster risk and sharing such information and how it is cre-
ated; strengthening disaster risk governance and
coordination across relevant institutions and sectors and the
full and meaningful participation of relevant stakeholders
at appropriate levels; investing in the economic, social,
health, cultural and educational resilience of persons,
communities and countries and in the environment, also
through technology and research; enhancing multi-hazard
EWS, preparedness, response, recovery, rehabilitation and
reconstruction’’ (UNISDR 2015, p. 6). In the following
paragraph, SFDRR acknowledges that people-centered risk
governance must be prioritized over simple monitoring
type of mechanisms: ‘‘While some progress in building
resilience and reducing losses and damages has been
achieved, a substantial reduction of disaster risk requires
perseverance and persistence, with a more explicit focus on
people and their health and livelihoods, and regular follow-
up’’ (UNISDR 2015, p. 6). Another plea for people-cen-
tered risk governance is echoed in SFDRR: ‘‘There has to
be a broader and a more people-centred preventive
approach to disaster risk. Disaster risk reduction practices
need to be multi-hazard and multisectoral based, inclusive
and accessible in order to be efficient and effective. While
recognizing their leading, regulatory and coordination role,
Governments should engage with relevant stakeholders,
including women, children and youth, persons with dis-
abilities, poor people, migrants, indigenous peoples, vol-
unteers, the community of practitioners and older persons
in the design and implementation of policies, plans and
standards’’ (UNISDR 2015, p. 5).
Notwithstanding many other similar calls for people-
centered DRR and risk governance, when it comes to
mobilizing investments and resources, both international
donor agencies and national governments are called to
action that reflects a top-down/technocratic type of mindset
in framing the risk governance. Consider this SFDRR
statement: ‘‘The pursuance of this [DRR] goal requires the
enhancement of the implementation capacity and capability
of developing countries, in particular the least developed
countries, small island developing States, landlocked
developing countries and African countries, as well as
middle-income countries facing specific challenges,
including the mobilization of support through international
cooperation for the provision of means of implementation
in accordance with their national priorities’’ (UNISDR
2015, p. 7). In the same, SFDRR (UNISDR 2015, p. 8)
frames proposition that EWS must be made available and
accessible to the people, notwithstanding the fact that mere
availability and accessibility of forecast information does
not necessarily change the decision-making processes of
vulnerable individuals and communities (as ample evi-
dence has shown with respect to the use and value of
forecast information-related research, for example Katz
and Murphy (1997)).
Another example of top-down state centric risk gover-
nance is found in the following set of guidelines (UNISDR,
p. 8): ‘‘(a) each State has the primary responsibility to
prevent and reduce disaster risk, including through inter-
national, regional, subregional, transboundary and bilateral
cooperation. The reduction of disaster risk is a common
concern for all States and the extent to which developing
countries are able to effectively enhance and implement
national disaster risk reduction policies and measures in the
context of their respective circumstances and capabilities
can be further enhanced through the provision of sustain-
able international cooperation; (b) disaster risk reduction
requires that responsibilities be shared by central Govern-
ments and relevant national authorities, sectors and stake-
holders, as appropriate to their national circumstances and
system of governance.’’ Assigning primary responsibility
at the state level belies the fact that many minority and
vulnerable populations in south Asian and African Sahel
countries are in fact in a state of proxy or actual wars
against their state governments, be those Pashtun/Taliban
fighting against Pakistan and Afghan national govern-
ments, or rebels in Mali or Sudan. In such situations, state
governments are actively engaged in providing mis- or dis-
information to such rebels as opposed to providing early
forecast information about droughts and floods. Further, in
many transboundary cases, state governments do not nec-
essarily provide the best means to promote international or
even regional cooperation. In the case of the Indus Basin,
for example, the highland/upstream forecasting of the
hydrometeorological system can be drastically improved if
the glacial melt and stream-flow data are shared between
China, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. It is not possible,
however, for a single state to engage in science or disaster
diplomacy and to negotiate a data-sharing mechanism to
improve the accuracy of medium to long range EWS.
Cooperation is required. Due to complicated water use
issues negotiated by the World Bank for the Indus Basin
Treaty between India and Pakistan, any sharing of data
between China, India, and Pakistan in pursuance of state-
driven international cooperation under the guidance of
SFDRR is a lofty dream.
A multilevel risk governance approach differs from a
top-down, technocratic model in that, instead of pinning
primary responsibility on state governments and interna-
tional bilateral or multilateral donor agencies, it engages
local communities, regional authorities, and transboundary
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partnerships in collaborative agreements. In this frame-
work, subnational or transnational authorities can be
empowered through persistent allocation of investments
and resources. Application of a multilevel risk governance
approach to implant DRR into development and planning
processes shifts power to local community scale market
and nonmarket dynamics. This shift in focus determines
what actually takes place on the ground, that is, whether
wetlands are conserved or destroyed; whether roads and
bridges are built on flood zones or not; whether intensive
agriculture is developed in drought prone areas or not.
Larger scale interest groups and entities can and do influ-
ence such local scale decision-making processes, as doc-
umented in Zia et al. (2011) and Zia (2013). However,
empowered local scale communities in a pluralistic and
multilevel risk governance system can push back against
top-down decisions from larger scale groups and entities. A
true test of SFDRR implementation will be if investments
and resources are allocated in such a way that local vul-
nerable communities are empowered to increase commu-
nity resilience and DRR with or without the support of
relevant national and regional entities. The SFDRR high-
lights the importance of people-centered, bottom-up pro-
cesses, although empowerment of local vulnerable
communities through democratic and participatory pro-
cesses cannot be achieved by paying lip service in the
framework. The tension between top-down and bottom-up
governance needs to be tackled upfront through the iden-
tification of multilevel risk governance means of
implementation.
4 Conclusions and Recommendations
for Improving the ‘‘Means of Implementation’’/
Multilevel Governance of Sendai Framework
In their evaluation of scientific and policy rationale behind
climate change-related capacity building efforts in devel-
oping countries, Glantz (2003) and Glantz and Adeel
(2000) maintain that adaptation to climate change-influ-
enced hazards, such as floods, droughts, and heat waves, is
perhaps the most important mechanism developing soci-
eties need to effectively respond to climatic changes.
Socioeconomic and political systems must respond at
multiple governance levels, from the individual household
to the national, regional, and global. In South Asia and the
African Sahel, for example, floods and droughts, respec-
tively, are among the most important natural factors
affecting local livelihoods. Although the SFDRR includes
people-centered, bottom-up rhetoric, it lacks explicit means
of implementation for governance structures that incorpo-
rate people-centered, bottom-up design. A business-as-
usual, top-down implementation of SFDRR, operating
through donor-driven programs and projects that do not
strategically incorporate local communities through mul-
tilevel risk governance institutions, will not likely change
the increasing trend of disasters. Effective DRR for
improved water and food security in developing countries,
such as in the Indus Basin and the African Sahel region,
requires more than technocentric approaches that set up
expensive tech-driven monitoring and EWS. To improve
societal outcomes, a fundamental transformation in the
conceptualization of multilevel governance is needed to
change the sources and beneficiaries of the ‘‘means of
implementation’’ for the DRR strategies identified in
SFDRR. This transformation will require design of EWS
that explicitly incorporate the decision-making contexts
and risk perceptions of local communities in the face of
known hydrometeorological hazards. As end-users of the
EWS, communities should be engaged and consulted to
ensure the design of systems for optimal local relevance
and use. Deliberate channels of information need to be
incorporated throughout the system to ensure dissemination
of information, including opportunities for feedback. To
achieve this, investment allocations should be balanced to
support monitoring/EWS and the local-level, land-use
development and decision-making processes of vulnerable
communities. The incorporation of a balanced multilevel
risk governance approach to the implementation of
SFDRR, as proposed in this article, would dramatically
improve progress towards attaining the 2030 DRR targets
identified in SFDRR.
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